Comments on: Ivory Tower vs PZ Myers

By: Ian

Ian — Thu, 22 Apr 2010 05:54:28 +0000

I made some clarifications to my post here.

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By: ADHR

ADHR — Sun, 18 Apr 2010 19:37:03 +0000

That was my first point. I don’t think Myers is trying to engage in an intellectual debate, so how is his failure to do good science or good philosophy even relevant? It’s like castigating Sidney Crosby for his inability to score touchdowns.

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By: Massimo Pigliucci

Massimo Pigliucci — Sun, 18 Apr 2010 07:21:07 +0000

Well, except that I most certainly do *not* practice postmodern philosophy, and that my main point was that PZ has lowered the level of discourse to an unacceptable level by simply hurling insults. That’s neither good science nor good philosophy, seems to me.

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By: ADHR

ADHR — Sun, 18 Apr 2010 00:11:41 +0000

Thinking about it, even “De Dora’s wrong because he’s a wanker” isn’t necessarily fallacious; it’s only fallacious if being a wanker is irrelevant to whether or not he’s right.

Okay, that would be very unlikely, unless we were to read “wanker” literally, and were dealing with some sort of onanistic issue. (Pun intentional.) It works with “liar”, though, as being a liar often is relevant to whether or not someone is likely to be saying things that are true. Same with “troll”, in internet contexts. Some philosophers get a bit hung up on the fact of abuse, ignoring that sometimes abuse is (morally and epistemically) deserved.

I think you may still be being a tish loose with postmodernism. Relativism isn’t a postmodern idea. Epistemic relativism is Protagoras, after all, and ethical relativism can be found possibly in Hume. The pragmatists are also somewhat relativistic, and I think they’ve taught us some very useful things. It’s more the deconstructivism, structuralism, post-structuralism, and all that business that’s problematic. (And even those may work, in limited scopes; it’s when they go global that, I think, they really lead us seriously astray.)

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By: Phil Plait

Phil Plait — Sat, 17 Apr 2010 19:08:31 +0000

Um. I asked skeptics to “step aside”? How the heck did you parse that from what I wrote?

I never said that. I said that there are two issues, one that involves everyone (the crimes) and one that involves skeptics (the supernatural motives). In fact, in several places in my post I say that skeptics need to step in and tackle this issue.

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By: Ian

Ian — Sat, 17 Apr 2010 16:59:17 +0000

Right on all accounts.

On ad hominens specifically I was thinking when I read that that Pigliucci got his definitions a bit mixed. An argument of De Dora is wrong because he’s a wanker is fallacious while saying he’s a wanker because his arguments are wrong is just an opinion.

And yes, I was sloppy in my use of postmodern. I was more imagining the postmodern application of philosophy – where you have relativists abusing some basic philosophical ideas.

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By: ADHR

ADHR — Sat, 17 Apr 2010 02:34:10 +0000

Pigliucci seems to be assuming that Myers is trying to engage in an intellectual dispute. He’s clearly not. (And, really, Jerry Fodor and Jaegwon Kim, to pick two, are infamous for some incredibly nasty personal attacks during intellectual conversations.) Pigliucci also assumes that ad hominem is always fallacious. It isn’t. (Someone in the comments nails him to the wall on that point, pointing that, in his terms, there’s a “fallacious” argument in the Apology.) I really have no idea what point Pigliucci thinks he’s making, except expressing some sort of weird prissiness.

That said, there’s nothing postmodern about acknowledging the limits of human knowledge. It’s a modern claim — you can find it in Kant, for example (wherein we can’t know God exists or doesn’t exist, for God is not a possible object of experience). Furthermore, the problems with induction are identified by moderns, classically by Hume. The postmodern move is to deny the possibility of any epistemic privilege — to overgeneralize from the failure of the grandest projects of the early moderns (Hobbes and Descartes come to mind) to a kind of epistemological pessimism, or even nihilism.

The funny things about postmodern philosophy are that, one, most of it isn’t done in philosophy departments (it’s more common in departments that end in “Studies” or English departments) and, two, it’s inspired by people (such as Hegel and Heidegger) who would find most of its claims shocking, if not offensive.

I don’t want to be too parochial regarding the first point, BTW. Philosophy departments don’t have the patent on philosophy, no more than science faculties do on science. But when an entire set of theories are systematically, for the most part, weeded out of the traditional disciplinary sphere, that has to mean something.

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By: Steven

Steven — Sat, 17 Apr 2010 00:20:35 +0000

I think PZ missed the point of Phil Plait’s argument. How I took it is that the “reasonable” catholics will be much more effective at leading the charge to change the church than the skeptics would. Not that the skeptics shouldn’t be involved. He didn’t go out and say it, but the logical extension to his post would be that, if there is a big movement in the catholic church to do something to right this and bring people to justice, the skeptical movement should support this, but let them lead the way. If they do nothing, then we should, but that since it is much more likely that catholics would listen to other catholics than the skeptics, if they want to do something, they will probably be more effective, and thus should do it. The ultimate goal is for justice, and change to the church so this doesn’t happen again, so the path most likely for success should be followed.

That’s my take on it, and I think its perfectly reasonable!

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